The main purpose of the paper is to explain the divergent paths of development of ethno-territorial protest 
Introduction
At least since the early 1960s ethno-territorial protest movements have increasingly challenged established patterns of political integration in western democracies. Great Britain, France, Spain or Canada, to name just a few examples, have all experienced such challenges. But it is not just the governments of these states who have to deal with this problem. It also poses a challenge to the social sciences, which have to explain the formation of these movements, and must also investigate the causes of the different paths of evolution the movements have taken. With regard to the latter aspect, and especially the nationalist movements in Corsica and Québec, we are presented with starkly dissimilar cases of conflict evolution. In the case of Corsica we can clearly speak of a progressive radicalization of nationalist activities and a fragmentation of the nationalist movement, with some of the groups operating outside the legal bounds of the political system. 1 The first signs of regional conflict articulation in Corsica became visible in the late 1950s, and can be described as a reaction against the central state policy of regional modernization in France. 2 The subsequent radicalization of the movement can be described in different phases, and can be explained as a result of the interaction of the regional protest articulation and the response of the French state. 3 High rates of terrorist activities and the participation of a variety of nationalist parties in the political system of Corsica are manifestations of this radicalization. Taking a different path, the nationalist movement in Québec has become highly integrated into the political system of the mainly francophone province, threatening the cohesion of the Canadian federation from inside the constitutional framework. In contrast to the fragmented Corsican movement, the nationalist forces in Québec are, at least since the founding of the Parti Québécois in 1970, for the most part integrated into this party. This party has shown a high degree of internal coherence over the last 30 years. 4 Two legal referendums for independence in 1980 and 1995, and a strictly nationalist politics of the PQ in government, are the visible signs of the integration of the nationalist forces into the political system.
The purpose of this paper is to take a closer look at the factors and conditions of the different paths of conflict evolution. The argument is developed in three stages. First, a theoretical framework is developed that focuses on the concept of elite interaction as a pivotal factor for the evolution of nationalist movements. Second, traditional patterns of elite accommodation before the upsurge of regional and nationalist protest in Quebec and Lammert, Ethno-territorial Accommodation Corsica are discussed, and the factors that threatened these systems are analyzed. Third, the evolution of the movements and the response of the respective states from the 1960s until today are investigated.
Theoretical Framework
The (re)emergence of ethno-territorial protest movements in the 1960s has lead to a lively discussion in the social sciences. Until the mid 1960s, ethno-nationalism and ethno-nationalist movements had been largely ignored. Modernization theories treated ethnicity as a somewhat archaic phenomenon, which was alleged to disappear in the process of modernization. 5 The political, social and economic conditions of modernization, it was assumed, required increasing standardization and homogenization.
The main agents of change were to be the educational system and the media, along with the army. Additionally, national elites were to transform the culturally different parts of the population into one political community, sharing historical symbols, descent and national interests, regardless of social inequalities and class differences. 6 With the benefit of hindsight, it is safe to conclude that modernization did not work as smoothly or uniformly as these theoretical models suggested. The persistence and reemergence of ethno-territorial protest movements posed a challenge that could hardly be ignored. At first, the attempts to cope with these perplexing anomalies tried to incorporate regional protest into the framework of modernization theory. Arend Lijphart, in particular, approached the problem as part of the nation-building process itself: if the latter is advancing too fast, the danger of a defective form of integration and assimilation of some groups arises. Lijphart still presupposed the integrative effects of modernization, but saw a disturbed transaction-integration balance as a base for ethnic conflicts. Lijphart wrote:
In the first place modernization may have assimilative effects in the earlier stage of the development but not in later stages....Second, national assimilation is an extremely slow process. This means that social mobilization is conductive to assimilation but only up to a certain point: when mobilization is rapid, assimilation will lag behind.
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A second type of approach has focused on the relationship between national minority movements and the process of socio-economic modernization. This approach depicts ethnic identities in opposition to the inescapable processes of modernization, as a revolt against modernity. As Seymour Lipset has written in this regard:
The most dramatic form of resistance to modernizing trends in post-industrial society has been the re-emergence of ethnic or linguistic nationalism in many countries. These movements object to the centralization of power, economic strength, and cultural dominance in the majority regions of their country. They seek, either through gaining independence or autonomy, to control educational and cultural facilities and to build up the economy of their areas. 8 In this context ethnic identity is seen as a given, primordialist concept and defined as a counterweight to socio-economic modernization. Ethnicity, in effect, is conceptualized as a basic principle of social reality that sleeps under the surface of modern societies and that is awakened if modernization fails.
A third type of approach assumes a closer connection between the process of modernization and the emergence of ethno-territorial protest movements. Studies from this perspective focus mainly on the connection between the historical roots of identities and the current form of identity articulation. The objective is to better understand the conditions that will lead to a politicization of ethnic groups. As in the primordialist approaches, ethnic identities are conceptualized as a given factor. But in contrast to the former the emphasis is on the causal factors that breed dissatisfaction and finally result in a rejection of established patterns of political integration. The conditions seen as the driving forces vary substantially in different models: in some cases uneven economic development is viewed as the main cause of mobilization. 9 More generally, the cause is sometimes seen as simply the perception that a group or territory suffers from an unequal distribution or resources. 10 Michael Hechter, for example, speaks of the cultural division of labour as the main source of ethnic conflict, 11 whereas other authors explain regional protest with reference to sectoral differences in the process of modernization. 12 Yet all approaches share the assumption that the key factors are part of the socio-economic situation of the analyzed group or territory as compared to the dominant society or to the core region of the state. Differences in economic growth rates, and in the pattern of political integration, result in a perception of inequality that can be interpreted in a cultural, political or economic sense. 13 But, as I have mentioned earlier, there are significant differences in the evolution of the nationalist movements in Corsica and France. Despite similar socio-economic environments the patterns of conflict evolution differ markedly in these two cases. This, I
would argue, can neither be explained with reference to factors relating to the movement themselves nor with reference to differences in the center-periphery structure. We need to reach beyond the factors discussed above and, in particular, introduce a temporal dimension into the comparative framework. The approach presented in this paper is designed to take into consideration the interests, goals and priorities of the nationalist interests. Such an approach allows us to distinguish clearly between the confining institutional, socio-economic and cultural conditions that constitutes the room for political action on the one side, and those factors on the other side that trace back to the motivations and decisions of political actors within this room. Tarrow's concept of political opportunity-structure, which has be refined by Rokkan and Urwin, might also be a helpful instrument to gauge the involved groups potentials for political action and the respective limits on their potentials. 16 Tarrow is focused on three factors: the openness or closeness of the political system for the articulation of new and alternative political interests, the stability of the electorate and the disposability of political partners in the system. The factors can by investigated by an analysis of the established forms of regional interest integration into the national system.
Traditional Patterns of Elite Accommodation
If Without such concessions to the countervailing power of the local communities, the strict interpretation of the rules would shatter the semblance of national unity which is the shibboleth on which state authority is based. In the following, I will discuss the evolution of the both movements and work out the conditions for the deviating paths of evolution they took by using Brass' concept of elite concurrence.
I will proceed by discussing Corsican nationalist movement first, proposing the following classification of the three step-development: The first phase, which I will refer Whereas newly formed groups first articulated regional protest in Corsica, protest in Quebec found expression within the established political system from the outset, the main and most important agent being the Parti Liberal du Québec (PLQ). 26 Thus 1960, the year the PLQ took power from the Union Nationale, seems to be the obvious date to set as the beginning of the evolution of the modern nationalist movement in Quebec.
1960 is also a year discussed in the literature as the starting point of the Quiet Revolution.
The programmatic transformation of the PLQ comes into sharper focus when viewed against the background of its traditional anti-nationalistic outlook. Until the 1950s the PLQ had been nothing more than a regional chapter of Liberal Party of Canada. The PLQ had been concerned mostly with policies on the federal level and the party had tried to articulate francophone interests as a part of this strategy. But tensions rose between the growing party bureaucracies at the provincial and the federal level. In combination with the increasing importance of provincial institutions resulting from the build-up of the Canadian welfare state, these tensions lead to a growing independence of the Liberal Party chapter in Quebec. 27 The process of socio-economic modernization in Canada also resulted in a fragmentation of the political system and the party system, primarily between the federal and provincial level. The centrifugal tendencies were particularly strong in the case of the francophone province that enjoyed a special status guaranteed by the Québec Act of 1774. Until the 1960s the established model of elite accommodation between the federal state and the francophone province had worked well. But this system of power sharing in Quebec was not adequate to the need of the modern welfare state. A new middle class found its way into the PLQ, using it as the main vehicle for its integration into the political system. Since the 1970s, the PQ has been a constant and strong factor in provincial and national politics. 29 In the early phase we can distinguish two wings of the PQ: a radical wing that opted for immediate separation of the province from Canada, and a moderate wing that demanded a referendum on the question of separation to be held before In the second referendum on separation in 1995 a razor-thin majority of 50.5 percent voted against separation. But as in the referendum 1980, the watered-down wording of the referendum question makes it hard to speak of a referendum on separation. In case of adoption, the referendum would have given the Quebec government nothing more but a mandate to negotiate a reform of the Canadian federation with the federal government.
The legal process of separation was in no way discussed. The situation in Québec presents a different picture. The new political forces that were organized in the process of socio-economic modernization were able to integrate themselves into the political system of the mainly francophone province Québec. This is partly because of the openness of Canadian federalism and the substantial degree of autonomy that allows regional and local actors to play an important role in the decision making process. In particular, the distinct situation of the province of Québec has to be mentioned here. The historically contingent, asymmetrical structures and elements of Canadian federalism left enough room for the nationalists in competing for votes and power.
To conclude, it seems clear now that support for and the success of nationalist arguments and movements is to a great extent the product of the political system itself.
We can observe this mechanism also in the Western Canadian provinces, where a subnational identity has been built without common cultural or ethnic tradition. It is obviously clear that this mechanism applies especially to the movement in Québec that is based on a set of common cultural norms and traditions and institutionalized rights on distinctiveness. The governing elites on the sub national level are influencing the evolution of the national movements with their political decisions and policy instruments.
These policies do not have to be based on cultural or ethnic traditions to have this impact on the evolution of the national movement. 34 In a federal system like Canada, the influence of these factors is bigger than in a centralized system like France, because the framework for political action is wider and more institutionalized on the sub-national level. In France, the center-periphery structure is primarily based on an informal system of interest accommodation. The provincial political elites in Canada want to protect the longstanding interests of their society and economy; they also they have a vested interest in provincial status and power which the several provincial electorates do not share fully, 35 which means an interest in maintaining political and administrative power themselves. These interests exist on the national level as well. The provincial as well as the national governments are not neutral contenders or reflecting mirrors, but aggressive actors steadily extending their tentacles of control, regulation, and manipulation into society-playing, in Deutsch's 'terminology, a steering role-and thus fostering sets of integrated relationships between themselves and the various socio-economic forces and interests in their jurisdiction.
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Alain Cairn's argument is very similar to the argument outlined in the work of Paul Brass. Following Brass, ethnic identity originates from the specific interaction between the elites of the central state and the elites of non-dominant ethnic groups. 37 It is not just the existence of cultural differences that is important, but the way in which these differences are converted into a basis for political differentiation. The central state response to the regional protest articulation plays an important role in shaping the problem. The established institutional framework and the process of interaction inbetween this framework determines the evolution of nationalist movements more than cultural factors.
